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December 1988 I. Introduction 
Recent empirical evidence has cast doubt on both the sticky-price model 
(see  Fischer  (1977)  and Phelps and Taylor  (1977))  and incompiete- 
information model  (see  Lucas  (1972))  of the unemployment/inflation trade- 
off.'  This paper presents an alternative model of the short-run  Phillips 
curve based on the idea that money has distributional effects that cause 
dispersion in growth across sectors.  In addition to explaining the short- 
6 
run Phillips curve relationship,  the model predicts a long-run positive 
relationship between inflation and unemployment. 
These results are reminiscent of Milton Friedman's Nobel Prize address 
(1977), where he argued that there exists a negatively sloped Phillips 
curve in the short run and a positively sloped Phillips curve in the long 
run.  Recently,  Kormendi and Maguire  (1985)  have provided supporting 
i  evidence for Friedman's hypothesis.  Using cross-country data, they show 
that there is a negative relationship between the inflation rate and the 
growth rate of real output.  This paper presents a model which explains 
these observations without relying on sticky prices or incomplete 
information. 
In  addition,  this paper is consistent with Lilien's sectoral shifts 
hypothesis.  Lilien  (1982)  has shown that unemployment is positively 
related to sectoral dispersion.  He argues that periods of high 
unemployment are .gharacterized  by a substantial amount of labor force 
reallocation. 
The model in this paper postulates that money has distributional 
effects that cause dispersion in the growth rate of output across sectors. 
The distributional effects of money may be motivated on several grounds. For example,  Feldstein  (1980)  argues that because depreciation is deducted 
at historic costs,  the high inflation rates of the 1970s caused a decline 
in the real stock value of firms.  This effect should be most pronounced in 
capital-intensive industries,  such as manufacturing.  In addition,  since 
capital-intensive industries have relatively long-lived assets,  a higher 
inflation rate will hurt the manufacturing sector more than it will the 
service sector: capital-intensive industries have more assets that must be 
deducted at historic costs,  and these assets are older on average. 
-  Consequently, a greater differential exists between the firm's historic 
price and the current purchase price of an asset. 
It follows that higher inflation will lead to increased sectoral 
dispersion as workers in the manufacturing sector relocate to the service 
sector.  The implication that increased inflation leads to increased 
sectoral dispersion is tested by regressing Lilien's dispersion index on 
the rate of inflation.  The regression yields a positive and significant 
coefficient on the inflation rate. 
Our model also explains the short-run  negative relationship between 
unemployment and inflation.  We assume that there are short-run  frictions 
that prevent workers from immediately switching sectors.  A higher 
inflation rate causes more sectoral dispersion,  which leads to an increase 
in the unemployment rate. The short-run effect,  however, is a decrease in 
unemployment as the currently unemployed accept jobs at a faster rate than 
the workers in the low-demand sector sever their employment relationships. 
z?2= 
This friction can be motivated on several grounds.  For example, 
Shultze  (1985)  argues that it is more costly to sever an employment 
relationship than it is to commence one. Alternatively,  this friction may 
be the result of industry-specific human capital.  If a fraction of the 
training necessary to switch sectors can be achieved while workers are employed in the original sector,  then the model can explain the short-run 
negative Phillips curve relationship.  The paper is organized as follows. 
Section I1 introduces the model and discusses its implicatiori2.  Section 
I11 presents the simulations and empirical work.  Section IV concludes with 
a discussion of additional empirical tests of the model. 
11.  The Model 
This section presents a two-period,  two-sector,  overlapping-generations 
model in which fiat money is the only store of value.  Agents are 
heterogeneous in the sense that they have different preferences for the two 
goods produced in the economy.  Each agent consumes one,  but not both,  of 
the two goods produced.  We label the goods "C" and "D" and assume that 
half of each generation is born with a preference for the C-good 
(henceforth  called the C-agents) and the other half is born with a 
preference for the  D-good  (henceforth  called the D-agents).  For 
simplicity,  we assume that C-agents are born into the C-sector and D-agents 
are born into the D-sector.  Agents may produce in either sector;  however,  - 
an agent born in one sector can produce in the other sector only if he 
undergoes a period of training,  costing 6. It is assumed that this training 
takes place on the job. 
As usual,  money enters this world via transfers to the old agents of 
each generation.  The asymmetric growth across sectors is generated by 
assuming that the old agents who consume the D-good get a larger per-capita 
money transfer than the old agents who consume the  C-good.  The assumption 
that money is transferred to agents based on their preferences is used as a 
proxy for the distributional effects of money or inflation in the real 
world.  Agents consume only in the second period of their life and have linear preferences over second-period consumption.  Each  young  person faces 
the constraint that his consumption  is less than or equal  to his total 
lifetime production plus his money  transfer.  When  young,  each agent 
produces a unit of  output in the sector in which  he is born.  When  old, an 
agent either produces  in the sector in which  he was  born,  moves  to the 
other sector and  produces,  or consumes  leisure.  If an agent chooses  to 
move  to the other sector, there is a  probability a  that he will find 
employment.  This prc-bability is derived endogenously  in a simple-search 
"model  in which  workers search across firms for a  good  job match.  It is 
assumed  that an unemployed worker  cannot  return to his original sector to 
work. 
Formally,  the preferences and  constraints are as follows: 
Preferences 
Ut  =  Ct+l  for C-agents 
Ut  - Dt+l  for D-agents 
Constraints 
Ct+l  5 Pt+l(l/Pt  + mt+E)  + 1 
c  d  Ct+l  5  Pt+l(l/Pt  + mt+l)  + Pt+l(l  + 
C 
Ct+l  Pt+lmt+l 
d  d 
Dt+l '  Pt+l/Pt+l (Pt/Pt + mt+$ 
where  mt+$  = money  transfer to C-agents and 
= money  transfer to D-agents.  mt+l 
C-agents  employed  in C-sect 
C-agents employed  in D-sect 
C-agents  unemployed 
D - agents 
We  follow the usual convention  that Pt  is the C-good  price of  money  at 
d  time t,  and  Pt  is the C-good  price of  the D-good.  Agents  who  remain  in the 
sector in  which  they were  born produce one  unit of output.  Agents  who 
move  to the other sector produce 1 +  E  units of output, where  E  is a  random productivity component assumed to be uniformly distributed between -1  and 
1.  The variable E  is assumed to  be an individual-  or firm-specific job- 
matching component. Unlike a standard job-matching model,  unemployed 
workers learn their job match after applying for a job instead of after 
working for a firm.  However,  an unemployed worker can apply for only a 
limited number of jobs  (for  simplicity assumed to be 1)  each period. 
The first constraint says that a C-agent who remains in the C-sector 
can sell his unit of output in period t for Pt  units of fiat currency, can 
carry that money into period t+l, and can purchase Pt+l units of the C- 
good.  In addition to  the value of first-period production,  this agent can 
consume the value of his money transfer ~~+~m~+t  and the additional unit 
produced in his second period of life.  The rest of the constraints are 
constructed in a similar fashion. 
Note that the above constraints consider only movements from the C- 
sector to the D-sector.  Since we consider only inflationary economies 
(those  that favor the D-good over the C-good),  this restriction will not 
affect our results. Therefore,  we do not consider a matching component for 
agents born in the D-sector who wish to move to the C-sector.  We impose 
this assumption in order to highlight the sectoral reallocation aspects of 
the model.  Allowing a matching component for D-sector workers  would not 
affect our general results. 
The C-agents of$  generation t face the decision in period t  of whether 
to remain in theiporiginal  sector for both periods or move to the D-sector 
at time t+l.  We assume that an agent must undergo training in order to 
move. The training costs 6,  takes one period to complete, and takes place 
while the young C-agent is employed. 
A fraction,  8,  of agents who decide to train and incur the cost 6 to switch sectors will quit in order to search for a job in the D-sector. Once 
they move to the D-sector they will accept a job as long as the 
productivity component, c, is greater than or equal to their reservation 
- 
productivity, ct.  Formally,  C-agents will retrain for a job in the D- 
sector as long as the following condition holds: 
+  (1 -  et+l)  (1) 
&here  6 - cost of training 
a - probability of accepting a job 
0 - probability of moving once a worker is trained 
B - utility value of leisure 
E  - worker-/.firm-specific  productivity component 
- 
ct = reservation productivity 
E[  ]  is the expectations operator. 
The left side of equation  (1)  represents the value of staying in the 
C-sector. Agents who stay in the C-sector produce and consume.one  unit of 
the C-good. The right side represents the expected return from migrating to 
the D-sector,  less the cost of retraining,  6.  There is a probability Bt+l 
that a C-agent  will switch sectors. The expected return from switching 
sectors is the probability that a worker accepts a job multiplied  by the 
value of his production in that sector,  plus the probability that he does 
.=. 
not accept a job multiplied  by the utility value of leisure. In 
equilibrium, C-agents will train to move to the D-sector until equation  (1) 
holds with equality. 
Retraining for a job and moving to another sector are separate 
decisions. Equation  (1)  determines y, the proportion of C-agents who retrain for jobs in the D-sector.  We also need to determine 8,  the 
proportion of retrained C-agents who will migrate to the D-sector.  Once a 
C-agent has retrained,  he will move as long as the following condition 
holds  : 
Notice that if there is no cost of training, 5 - 0,  and 0 - 1,  then 
equations  (1)  and  (2)  are identical.  Although the retraining and migrating 
decisions are separate, casual inspection of equations  (1)  and  (2)  reveals 
that with perfect foresight, 0  - 1.  However,  if money growth is less than 
expected,  8  may be less than 1. Recall that agents must plan one period 
ahead in order to move. If their one-period-ahead plans are based on high 
inflation and if the realized inflation rate is low, the return to 
switching sectors may be so low as to reverse the inequality in equation  (2). 
For workers who chose to retrain and subsequently decided to quit, 
- 
their reservation match is given by E.  This reservation productivity is 
derived from a standard search model. Workers' productivities are assumed 
to be randomly distributed across firms.  Unemployed workers compare the 
return from accepting a job with a particular match, c, with the value of 
e, 
remaining unemployed,  B.  Unemployed workers can apply for only one job 
during the second period of their life.  After the application process, 
both the applicant and the firm  observe the worker's productivity,  1  +  c. 
The reservation productivity is determined by An agent is indifferent between a match of  and not working,  in which 
case the agent consumes the value of his leisure B. A C-agent who accepts a 
job producing 1 +  c units of the D-good can sell it and consume pt+f(l  + 
ct+~).  Recalling that c  is uniformly distributed from -1  to 1,  the 
probability that a C-agent will accept a job is equal to 
Money transfers in this economy are asymmetric,  that is,  D-agents get a 
larger per-capita money transfer than C-agents.  This assumption implies 
the following money transfer scheme: 
m:  =  Xnmt- 
m:  =  (l-l)~m~-~ 
where T = growth rate of the money supply and 
X  = distribution  parameter: 0 I  X  5 1/2. 
We restrict  0 i  X  I1/2  in order to induce the asymmetric effects 
described above.  To close the model,  we use the preferences and 
constraints to solve for equilibrium in the C-good and D-good markets. 
C-good equilZbrium  (supply = demand) D-good equilibrium  (supply  = demand) 
- 
2  + ^lt-let~$t(l +  E[rlr 2  rtl) 
d  =  1 +  (1 -  u"mt-lPt/Pt +  (P~-~P~)/(P~-~P:) 
The left side of equation  (5)  represents the supply of the C-good at 
time t.  The first term is the supply of the young.  The second term, 
1 -  et-Yt-ls  is the supply of the old who remained in the C-sector.  There are 
1 -  Btyt-l  old C-agents who remain in the C-sector at time t,  each of whom 
produces one unit of output.  The first term on the right side is the 
demand by the old who remain in the C-sector. The second term represents 
the goods purchased in period t by those who were young in period t-1. 
Each  young C-agent in period t-1  purchases l/Pt-l units of currency.  This 
currency can purchase Pt/Pt-l  units of the C-good in period t.  The third 
term represents the amount of the C-good that can be purchased with the 
money transfer given to the old C-agents.  The last term is the demand by 
the old who moved to the D-sector and accepted employment. 
4 
Equation  (6)  was constructed in a similar fashion. The "2"  represents 
the supply of the young and old D-agents.  The second term is the supply of 
the old C-agents who accepted employment in the D-sector.  The right  side 
of equation  (6)  $s  the demand for the D-good. 
Equilibrium in this economy is characterized by a set of sequences 
d  - 
(PtJ  Pt ,  Dt,  Ct,  Bt, yt,  at,  rt)  for t = 1,  ..., that satisfy equations 
(1)  through  (6).  These six equations can be solved for six reduced-form 
expressions  (see  the appendix for the details of this procedure): 
Pt  =  P(B,X,n,6,mt)  Price of money 
d  ptd = P (B,1,~,6)  Price of D-good Yt =  7(B,A,r,6)  Proportion of C-agents training for jobs in the 
D-sector 
Bt  =  B(B,A,r,S)  Proportion of trained workers who migrate 
- 
zt  =  c(B,X,r,S)  Keservation productivity 
at  =  a(B,A,r,S)  Probability of accepting a job 
Since these equations are algebraically quite cumbersome and do not 
yield an analytical solution,  we parameterize the model and calculate the  - 
solution using a computer program designed to solve nonlinear difference 
equations. 
By choosing parameter values for ,8,  A,  n, 6,  and mg,  we could simulate 
the dynamics of the economy starting from date t =  0.  However,  we are 
interested in both the short-run  and long-run effects of changes in money 
on the unemployment and inflation rates. We address these questions by 
first calculating a steady-state solution for a given set of parameter 
values.  We use the steady-state  solutions for mP  (real  money 
- 
balances),  pd, 7, 8, e  and a  as initial values and then calculate the 
transition path to the new steady-state solution that results from a change 
in the growth rate of money, r. 
The choice of using a steady-state solution as initial starting values 
is arbitrary.  We could alternatively simulate the transition from any non- 
steady-state solution;  however,  there are an infinite number to choose 
from. We therefore%ollow  the usual practice of starting from a steady- 
state solution.  2 
Formally, the procedure for calculating a solution to this model 
involves the following three steps: 
(1)  Choose parameter values for B,  A,  no,  6,  mo. - 
(2)  Calculate the steady-state solution for mP, pd,  7,  0, c, and a 
(3)  Change the  growth rate of money, x, and calculate the  transition 
path to the new steady-state solution. 
- 
This three-step procedure is accomplished using the MINPACK-1 FORTRAN 
subroutines.  The steady-  state equations and the transition equations are 
programmed into the computer as a system of 90 nonlinear equations in 90 
unknowns.  This allows 12 equations for the calculation of two initial 
steady states and 78 equations  (13  time periods) for the transition between 
steady states.  Using a variation on Powell's hybrid method, MINPACK-1 then 
solves for the endogenous variables of the systeme4 The following section 
presents the simulation results and empirical work. 
111. Simulations and Empirical Work 
Simulations 
This section presents and discusses the simulations of the model. 
Tables 1 through 9 present the results of our simulations.  The entries 
for time periods 1 and 2 in each table represent the steady-state solutions 
to the model when the growth rate of money is equal to no.  Time periods 3 
through 15 are the transition paths from the old steady state to the new 
steady state,  with the growth rate of money equal to  x.  Each table also 
reports the norm of.the  residuals from the simulations.  This is simply the 
Euclidean norm of ehe solution error vector for the 90-equation system. 
The free parameter S is fixed throughout the simulations at .01.  We 
experimented with various values for 6  without affecting the nature of our 
results.  The free parameter B,  the utility value of leisure,  is chosen 
within the interval (0,l).  If B 2 1,  then all unemployed C-agents would 
choose to consume leisure,  a =  0.  If B 5 0,  then all unemployed C-agents 
would accept employment in the D-sector,  a = 1.  We report experiments with two values of B: B =  .8 and B =  .95. 
Tables 1 through 4  show the effects of an increase in the growth rate 
of money,  assuming that all money transfers go to the D-agents,  X  = 0. 
Time periods 1 and 2 show the steady-state solution when the growth rate of 
money is no.  Time periods 3 through 15 show the effects of an increase in 
the growth rate of money from no to n. 
The dynamics of this economy can be understood by examining table 1. 
Here the experiment is to increase the growth rate of money from 15 percent 
to 16 percent with B =  .80.  Notice that the initial effect of an increase 
in the growth rate of money is to increase the price of the D-good in time 
period 3.  This result follows directly from the assumed asymmetric money 
transfer.  The increase in P$  has two separate effects.  First, it causes 
more unemployed C-agents to accept jobs,  that is,  a increases.  Second,  it 
causes a larger proportion of the young C-agents to decide to train for 
work in the D-sector,  that is, y  increases. It would at first seem that the 
overall effect is ambiguous. However,  because of'the one-period waiting, 
the first  effect dominates in the short run  (that  is,  for one period).  The 
short-run  Phillips curve obtains because the unemployed C-agents accept 
jobs faster than the young C-agents can retrain and switch sectors. 
Notice also that inflation rises to only 15.35 percent in time period 3 
although money growth,  T,  increases to 16 percent.  This results from the 
non-neutral effects of money described above. 
All agents €Ske only one period to retrain and switch sectors,  so 
this short-run effect lasts for only one period.  In time period 4,  there 
is an overshooting of the unemployment rate. Because C-agents are 
constrained from moving to the D-sector in period 3,  the price of the D- 
good overshoots. The demand for the D-good rises,  but because of the one- period waiting, the supply is relatively inelastic.  This overshooting 
causes a large increase in y in time period 3 and, therefore,  an 
overshooting of the unemployment rate in time period 4.  5 
.s 
The long-run  effect of an increase in the growth rate of money is an 
increase in the proportion of C-agents who migrate to the D-sector,  ye. 
This is the increase in sectoral dispersion tested later in this section. 
Table 2 presents the results from a similar experiment.  The only 
difference is that B =  .95,  which,  as expected,  causes an increase in the 
unemployment rates but no change in the overall dynamics of the economy. 
Tables 3 and 4  present results for changes in the growth rate of money from 
4  percent to 5 percent.  Table 3 shows the effects of this change when 
B - .80.  Table 4  shows the results when B - .95.  Again,  these experiments 
show the same dynamics as the first experiment.  In each case there is a 
short-run decrease and a long-run increase in unemployment. The only 
differences are in levels of the variables. 
Tables 5 through 8 show the effects  .of  a decrease .in  the growth rate of 
money. Recall that unexpected decreases in the growth rate of money may 
cause B  to fall below 1.  To simplify our presentation,  we chose changes in 
the growth rate of money that were small enough in magnitude so that 0  did 
not change. 
Table 5 shows the effects of a decrease in the growth rate of money 
from 15 percent to"24 percent with B =  .80.  The initial effect of this 
d  decrease  is a decrease in P3.  This causes fewer unemployed C-agents to 
accept jobs; that is,  a decreases.  At the same time, there is a decrease 
in the proportion of C-agents who train for work in the D-sector; that is, 
y  decreases.  The short-run  Phillips curve again obtains because of the 
time lag between the decrease in demand and the decrease in the flow of 
workers from the C-sector to the D-sector.  In the long run, this flow decreases and the unemployment rate permanently falls. 
Tables 6 through 8 show the results from additional experiments with 
decreases in the growth rate of money.  Again, the dynamics are the same as 
those presented in table 5.  The only differences are in the magnitudes of 
the variables. 
Table 9 shows what happens when money is distributed evenly among all 
agents in the economy, that is,  X  =  .50.  Notice that there is still a 
slight Phillips curve relationship in time period 3.  Although half of the 
money goes to agents with a preference for the C-good and the other half 
goes to agents with a preference for the D-good,  money is not neutral.  The 
reason for this non-neutrality is that C-agents hold more real balances 
than D-agents,  because of the matching component for C-agents who switch 
sectors and accept jobs.  These C-agents will produce more than the D- 
agents  (1  +  E:  as compared to l)  and therefore will carry more real balances 
,.  .. 
into the next period. 
Even though C-agents and D-agents receive equal money transfers,  C- 
agents are worse off since they bear more of the inflation tax on their 
larger money balances.  This asymmetry causes the price of the D-good to 
d  rise in period 3. The increase in the price of.the  D-good,  Pt,  in the third 
time period causes a,larger  fraction of unemployed workers to accept 
employment,  that is,  a3 increases and,  because of the one-period waiting 
(due  to the one-period job training) there is a slight Phillips curve 
effect.  .as 
Empirical Work 
This section presents evidence in support of the implication that 
sectoral  dispersion is positively related to the inflation rate.  Recall that the model presented above yields this implication because money is 
assumed to have distributional effects that cause dispersjon in the growth 
of output across the two sectors.  This dispersion in growth leads to an 
increase in the flow of workers from the C-sector to the D-sector  (an 
increase in Y~-~B~),  which leads to an increase in unemployment. Since the 
growth rate of money is positively related to the inflation rate, the model 
yields a positive relationship between inflation and sectoral shifts. 
These results are consistent with the empirical work by Lilien (1982), 
who showed that half of the variation in post-World War I1 unemployment was 
due to sectoral shifts unemployment.  To measure sectoral shifts,  Lilien 
constructed an index of sectoral dispersion.  Using an eleven-industry 
decomposition of aggregate employment,  he defined sectoral dispersion as 
where xit  is employment in industry i at time t and Xt  is aggregate . 
employment at time t.6  He then regressed unemployment on this measure of 
sectoral  dispersion and found a significant positive relationship.  7 
In the economy  we have modeled, an increase in the growth rate of 
money leads to an 5ncrease in inflation and an increase in sectoral 
dispersion as a larger proportion of C-agents switch to the D-sector. In 
the real world,  one could expect inflation or changes in money to cause 
sectoral dispersion.  One way in which money may have direct distributional 
effects is through the discount window.  Discount-window transactions can 
be thought of as a direct subsidy to the banking sector.  However, the 
volume of transactions through the window is small and therefore probably not empirically important.  8 
Inflation may have direct distributional effects as well.  As discussed 
in the introduction,  these distributional effects may arise because of the 
asymmetry imposed by the tax laws. Another way in which inflation may have 
distributional effects is through the inflation tax on real cash balances. 
For example,  if the interest elasticity of money demand  is positively 
related to income, as would be the case if there is some fixed cost 
associated with transacting in the bond market, then inflation will 
redistribute income from the relatively poor to the relatively rich.  This 
would cause sectoral dispersion if the relatively rich buy a different 
basket of goods than do the relatively poor. 
To test the implication that inflation and sectoral shifts are 
positively related, we regress a on the rate of inflation as measured by 
the annual percentage rate of change in the Consumer Price Index.  The 
results from this regression are presented in table 10.  The first row 
shows the results of a regressed on only contemporaneous inflation.  The 
coefficient of .002  is significantly different from 0  at the .10 level. 
Rows 2 and  3 show the results from regressing a on contemporaneous 
inflation and one and two lags of inflation, respectively.  In-both cases, 
the sums of the coefficients on inflation  are significantly different from 
zero.  In regression 2,  the sum is significant at the .O1 level;  in 
regression 3,  the sum is significant at the .10 level. These results are 
consistent with,&he  implication of our model.  9 
The implication that an increase in inflation permanently increases the 
unemployment rate arises in our model because of the overlapping 
generations structure.  Half of the population is born into the C-sector 
and half of the population is born into the D-sector each period; that is, 
even after the economy permanently moves to a higher inflation rate,  agents continue to be born into the "wrong" sector.  This feature of the model can 
be thought of as capturing the continuous churning that occurs in the real 
world.  In other words, because of individual-  or firm-specific 
productivity, workers are continuously moving across sectors, even in the 
absence of any asymmetric growth. 
The empirical work presented above can be thought of as capturing the 
distributional effect of inflation.  We may also be capturing the effects 
of an increase in the variance of inflation.  Whenever the inflation rate 
changes, the distributional effects are reversed and sectoral  dispersion 
increases.  It is quite possible that our regressions reflect this 
relationship, since the inflation rate is positively related to its own 
variance. 
IV. Summary and Conclusion  . 
This paper presents an alternative model of the Phillips curve based on 
the distributional effects of money and/or  inflation.  These distributional 
effects imply a positive relationship between inflation and sectoral 
dispersion, which was tested and found to be significant. 
These preliminary results suggest that zero inflation and zero 
inflation variance should be a policy goal.  lo  To the extent that inflation 
has distributional effects, increases in the inflation rate may actually 
s. 
lead to a long-run increase in the unemployment rate as suggested by 
Friedman (1977),  and more recently as argued by Stockman  (1981).  These 
results are preliminary,  however, and much additional empirical work needs 
to be done before we fully understand the linkages between inflation and 
sectoral dispersion.  This work suggests that we take a closer look at 
measuring the distributional effects of inflation.  In particular,  we need to determine whether the distributional effects correspond to the direction 
of employment flows. In other words,  if inflation hurts manufacturing more 
than services,  then we would expect to see a reallocation of workers from 
manufacturing to services when inflation is high  (casual  inspection of the 
U.S. data suggests that this is true).  This question is best addressed by 
looking at panel data. 
In addition to looking more closely at the long-run implications, 
further empirical work must be done to establish whether the short-run 
Phillips relation arises because of our assumed frictions.  This could be 
accomplished by looking more closely at data measuring the inflows into, 
and outflows from, unemployment.  Our model predicts that the short-run 
fluctuations in unemployment are due mainly to changes in outflows,  but 
current empirical evidence is mixed.  Darby,  Haltiwanger and Plant  (1986) 
find that changes in unemployment are dominated by changes in inflows. 
However,  evidence for the United Kingdom shows that outflows dominate. 
Neither study decomposes shocks into real and monetary. One would expect 
that if real shocks are the major sources of sectoral dispersion, then 
1  changes in unemployment are dominated by inflows.  Our model,  however, 
suggests that sectoral dispersion caused by monetary and/or  inflation 
shocks would be dominated by outflows. Footnotes 
See Ahmed  (1987)  for evidence against the sticGy-wage  models of the 
business cycle.  Barro and Hercowitz  (1980)  and Boschen and Grossman 
(1982)  discuss the problems of reconciling contemporaneous monetary 
information with the incomplete-information  models of the business 
cycle. 
For an example bf this technique see Auerbach and Kotlikoff  (1987). 
The MINPACK-1 subroutines are public domain.  They are zvailable from 
Argonne National Laboratory,  Argonne,  Illinois. 
For  a  discussion of this  method  see  MorB, Garbow, and 
Hillstrom  (1980). 
We suspect that in the real world,  information about production 
opportunities in other sectors arrives at a more even pace. If we 
modeled that assumption explicitly, then the increase in the proportion 
of workers flowing to the D-sector would be a distributed lag process 
that would smooth the overshooting considerably. 
The 11 industries used in Lilien's measure are mining; construction; 
manufacturing;  transportation; wholesale trade; retail trade; 
finance, insurance,  and real estate; services; federal government; 
state government;  and local government. 
Recently,  Abraham and Katz  (1987)  have shown that Lilien may have 
overestimated the magnitude of sectoral  shifts unemployment by not 
correctly considering the interaction between aggregate shocks and 
sectoral  dispersion. 
For evidence on the volume of discount-window transactions,  see Mengle 
(1986). 
In addition to testing the relationship between inflation and sectoral 
shifts, Te  also regressed u on changes in the monetary base. The 
regressions yielded insignificant coefficients on contemporaneous and 
lagged money.  In addition,  the sums of the coefficients on money were 
insignificantly different from zero. 
This policy goal has been argued elsewhere on the grounds that 
inflation may have distributional effects.  For example,  see Gavin 
and Stockman  (1988). TIME 
TIME 
TABLE  1 
no =  .15  .rr  =  .16 
NORM  OF THE  RESIDUALS  0.6192512E-04 
ALPHA  THETA 
INFLATION 
P  PD  GAMMA 





no = .15  ~r  =  -16 
NORM OF THE RESIDUALS  0.5062552E-04 
THETA 




TO =  -05  T =  .06 
NORM OF THE RESIDUALS  0.3187718E-04 
ALPHA  THETA 




7~0  = .05  m  =  .06 
NORM OF THE RESIDUALS  0.4694517E-04 
ALPHA  THETA 
INFLATION  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
GAMMA TIME 
TIME 
TABLE  5 
KO  =  .15  r  =  .14 
NORM OF THE  RESIDUALS  0.27182343-05 
ALPHA  THETA 
INFLATION  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
GAMMA TABLE  6 
TIME 
TIME 
NORM OF THE RESIDUALS  0.1075217E-03 
ALPHA  THETA 





TO =  .05  T  = .04 
NORM OF THE RESIDUALS  0.1782243E-04 
THETA 
INFLATION  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
GAMMA TIME 
TIME 
TABLE  8 
xo =  .05  .rr  =  .04 
NORM OF THE RESIDUALS  0.14763503-05 
ALPHA  THETA 
INFLATION  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
GAMMA TIME  ALPHA 
TABLE 9 
TO = .15  T = .16 





UNEMPLOYMENT RATE TABLE 10 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
Dependent Variable  :  a 
Annual Observation: 1951 -  1980. 
Regression  Constant  Trend  "t  "t-l  "t-2  sum 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. 
All regressions were corrected for first-order serial correlation. 
Source: a is from Lilien  (1982). Appendix 
Derivation of Equations Used in Simulations 
Determination  of y, the proportion of C-agents who train for work 
in the D-sector: 
Determination of 8, the proportion of trained workers who choose to 
move to the D-sector: 
Determination of  rt, the  reservation productivity for a  trained  C- 
agent  : 
d  - 
Pt+l(l  +  't+l)  =  B.  (3) 
Determination of the probability of accepting employment: 
1 
C-good equilibrium  (supply = demand): D-good equilibrium  (supply  = demand): 
=  1  +  (1 -  ~)xm~-~~~/~f  +  (P~.~P~)/(P~-~P~)  (6 
In equilibrium, equation  (1)  holds at equality.  For the economies we 
consider,  the changes in inflation are small enough to make  (2)  hold at 
strict inequality at all times.  This implies that 6 = 1.  To derive the 
equations used in the simulation program,  substitute in for the conditional 
- 
expectation of st: 
-.- 
The final six equations used in the simulations are References 
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